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ABSTRACT  
   
This paper examines dealers' inventory holding periods and the associated 
price markups on corporate bonds from 2003 to 2010. Changes in these measures 
explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate bond prices. 
In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant liquidity 
measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond prices. Both 
measures shed light on the credit spread puzzle: changes in credit spread are 
positively correlated with changes in holding periods and markups, and a large 
portion of credit spread changes is explained by them. The economic effects of 
holding periods and markups are particularly sharp during crisis periods. 
  ii 
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Theory predicts that liquidity is important in the pricing of assets (Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986), and Acharya and Pedersen (2005)). In an early important 
paper, Demsetz (1968) provides an intuitive framework that relates immediacy to 
liquidity. He argues that the asynchronous arrival of buyers and sellers generates 
the demand for and supply of immediacy. By providing immediacy, dealers 
provide liquidity to investors. In doing so, they face risk, for which they must be 
compensated. This risk could be through inventory effects (see Garman (1976), 
Stoll (1978), Amihud and Mendelson (1980), and Ho and Stoll (1981) or/and 
through information asymmetry (see Wang (1993), Garleanu and Pedersen 
(2004)). Chacko, Jurek, and Stafford (2008) build on this insight and study how 
such immediacy is priced when market makers provide liquidity in the presence 
of order imbalances.  
The corporate bond market is an over-the-counter market where search 
frictions are particularly important (see Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005)). It 
fits the Demsetz paradigm in two ways.  First, for the most part, investors (both 
retail and institutional) cannot trade directly with themselves.  Second, dealers 
provide immediacy through their continuous presence in the market place. These 
features make the corporate bond market an ideal place to study the linkages 
among immediacy, liquidity, and prices. While intuition and theory tell us that 
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illiquidity should be particularly important in the pricing of corporate bonds, the 
existing liquidity empirical literature has had limited success, especially with 
respect to the so-called credit spread puzzle (Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Martin (2001)): variables that should in theory determine credit spread changes 
have rather limited explanatory power.  
Early work on liquidity in the corporate bond market focuses primarily on 
bid-ask spreads (Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006), Chen, 
Lesmond and Wei (2007), Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007), Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007)). The bid-ask spread is an important indicator of 
liquidity, however, it does not fully capture many important aspects of liquidity 
such as depth (the dollar value that can be traded at the quoted bid and ask prices). 
More recently, Bao, Pan and Wang (2010) use the negative of the autocovariance 
of relative price changes as a proxy for liquidity.  They find that illiquidity in 
corporate bonds is much greater than that captured merely by bid-ask spreads; 
their asset pricing regressions make considerable headway in the cross-section 
and time series, but they do not tackle the credit spread puzzle. 
We take a slightly different approach than the existing literature. We 
explicitly recognize the importance of immediacy and its relation with liquidity. 
Our data allow us to calculate the number of days that dealers hold inventory as 
well as the price markup they charge in turning that inventory around.  We think 
of the former as measuring the risk borne by dealers and the latter as the 
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commensurate return, matching up with the elemental notions of immediacy 
embedded in Demsetz (1968). Together, they tell us how fast and at what cost an 
investor can obtain or dispose of a particular quantity of a given asset. Aside from 
the elegant link to theory, these two measures are model free, and possess a 
distinct practical advantage. Specifically, they are easily measurable for a large 
universe – one merely needs to ensure that trades are signed as dealer/customer 
buys and sells. In contrast, bid-ask spreads are subject to data and measurements 
issues:  the corporate bond market is not centralized, and does not have mandated 
centralized reporting, such as the Consolidated Tape or Quote System for stocks, 
so that quoted spreads (where available) are at best indicative. Similarly, 
autocovariance based measures require frequent trading.  For example, it is not 
uncommon to impose the requirement that bonds trade on a large fraction of the 
trading days in a sample.  The consequence is that such measures can only be 
estimated for bonds in the most liquid segment of the market.  
Since our data does not identify individual dealers, we treat all dealers as a 
group and attempt to measure bond-specific liquidity provided by the entire dealer 
system. We measure dealer inventory holding period as the difference between 
dealers’ purchase date and the corresponding resale dates using a first-in-first-out 
(FIFO) method.  Markup is the difference between dealers’ purchase price and the 
resale price, divided by the midpoint of purchase price and the resale price. 
Before proceeding to formal asset pricing tests, we start with an assessment of the 
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two measures and examine their connections with various bond characteristics. 
We show that older bonds with smaller issuance size and longer maturity have 
higher markups and longer holding periods. More interestingly, the overall 
explanatory power of these traditional liquidity measures is only 4% for holding 
periods and 10% for markup. This implies that a large portion of our measures is 
not explained by conventional indirect liquidity proxies. We construct monthly 
cross sections of individual bonds holding periods and markups and then use 
cross-sectional medians in time series tests. Our monthly median illiquidity 
measures comove strongly with the aggregate market condition variables, 
particularly expected volatility (as measured by VIX) and funding costs (as 
measured by the TED spread). Their comovement during the financial crisis is 
especially noteworthy. In September 2007, when the subprime industry started to 
collapse, our illiquidity measures almost double from their pre-crisis average. 
Illiquidity quadruples by October 2008, right after the Lehman bankruptcy and the 
bailout of AIG. Subsequent to that, illiquidity declines, coinciding with funding 
injections by the Federal Reserve and better market conditions. Formal 
regressions of bond illiquidity on the TED spread support the connection between 
market liquidity and funding liquidity modeled by Brunnermeier and Pedersen 
(2009). We also find that the liquidity of low credit rating bonds is more sensitive 
to worse macroeconomic conditions than is the liquidity of high credit rating 
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bonds. This supports the “flight to quality” argument in Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009). 
Illiquidity is also an important factor in explaining the variation of the US 
aggregate yield spreads. Using the Barclays US corporate bond yield spread as a 
dependent variable, for the full sample period, a time series regression on holding 
period and markup alone has an adjusted R2 of 19%. Adding an index of CDS 
prices, VIX, and other proxies and determinants of credit risk increases the 
adjusted R2 to 46%, suggesting that illiquidity and credit risk are equally 
important in explaining yield spreads. We also find that the relative importance of 
illiquidity and credit risk changes dramatically in the crisis period. During the 
non-crisis period, illiquidity effects are over-shadowed by credit risk: regressions 
of aggregate US corporate bond yield spreads on illiquidity proxies alone have an 
adjusted R2 of only 12%, and combining credit risk increases the adjusted R2 to 
around 38%. In the crisis period, the adjusted R2 for illiquidity alone triples to 
around 30%, larger than the combined additional explanatory power of all other 
factors. In addition, US aggregate yield spreads are more sensitive to illiquidity in 
the crisis period than in the normal periods.  The coefficients of both holding 
period and markup double in the crisis period. 
In the cross-section, we estimate monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of 
individual bond yield spreads on these measures. Our regressions show that 
holding periods and markups together significantly explain the cross-section 
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variation of individual bond prices in both economic and statistical terms. For the 
full sample period, a one standard deviation difference in holding periods (markup) 
leads to a difference in yield spreads of 11 (128) bps. In the crisis period, a one 
standard deviation difference in holding period (markup) leads to a difference in 
yield spreads as much as 32 (271) bps. Adjusted R2 are also higher during the 
crisis period, increasing from 40% to 55%. In contrast, other conventional 
illiquidity proxies such as size, age, maturity are either statistically insignificant 
or have the wrong sign.  
Finally, we assess the usefulness of these measures for the credit spread 
puzzle. Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Huang and Huang 
(2003) report that credit risk determinants proposed by traditional structural 
models can only explain about 25% of levels of or changes in credit spreads of 
corporate bonds. Intriguingly, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) find 
that their regression residuals are highly cross-correlated and driven by a common 
systematic component. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) suggest that illiquidity 
may be an additional determinant of the yield spread variation. Empirical attempts 
at using illiquidity proxies to explain credit spread changes have had limited 
success (Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007), Driessen (2005), and Delianedis and 
Geske (2001)).  While we cannot claim to “solve” the puzzle, our illiquidity 
measures make substantial progress.  For B to AAA rated bonds, adding our 
measures to regressions of credit spread changes (while including structural 
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determinants) increases average adjusted R2 from 27% to over 40%.1
  
 This 
suggests that that liquidity is an important determinant of credit spread changes, 
beyond the pure contingent-claims framework (i.e. conventional structural 
models).  Moreover, consistent with Huang (2003) and Acharya, Amihud, and 
Bharath (2010), we find that illiquidity has much larger effects on bond spread 
changes during crisis.  
                                                 
1 For lower rated bonds (between CCC and C), structural models alone explain over 60% of credit 





We review the literature that studies the relationship between liquidity and 
asset prices in bond markets. In the literature, there are two types of models are 
related to this topic: inventory based model and information based model. The 
key question for inventory based models is how market makers deal with price 
and inventory uncertainty. Beginning with the pioneering paper by Garman 
(1976), researchers mainly studied how asset prices change given the nature of the 
order flow and the market-clearing protocol. Since not all investors are present in 
the market all of the time, market makers provide liquidity through their 
continuous presence in the market and thus enable continuous trading. Naturally, 
they face fundamental price change risk in the duration. Garman (1976) 
introduces a model with a monopolist market maker whose quoted prices affect 
the intensity of arrival of buyers and sellers. In his analysis, if quoted prices are 
constant, the market maker will surely be ruined. While inventory determines the 
market maker’s viability, inventory itself plays no role in the market maker’s 
decision problem in Garman’s model, since he assumes that market makers are 
only allowed to set prices at the beginning of trading. This restriction severely 
limits the applicability of his model to actual market settings in which prices 
evolve continually over time. A more realistic approach to resolve the underlying 
problem is to consider how the market marker’s prices change as the inventory 
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position varies over time. Amihud and Mendelson (1980) take this approach. 
Their model explicitly incorporates inventory into the market maker’s pricing 
problem. Using essentially the same framework as Garman (1976), they show that 
the market maker’s quoted bid and ask prices depend on the level of his inventory 
position. Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1981) investigate the market maker’s 
optimization problem. The Ho and Stoll (1981) model essentially extends the 
intuition of the Stoll (1978) analysis to a multi-period framework. As in Garman 
(1976), Ho and Stoll assume order flow is a stochastic process and depends on the 
market maker’s pricing strategy. However, their model also assumes a risk-averse 
market maker who manages inventory to reduce his risk exposure. This is a 
significant difference from the risk neutral intertemporal models of Garman (1976) 
and Amihud and Mendelson (1980). Overall, the common features to all the 
inventory based models considered here is that: market makers essentially act as 
the sole provider of liquidity in the market. Inventory introduces risks for them. 
This risk is reflected in their pricing strategy, i.e. the quoted bid and asks prices. 
The bid-ask spread plays a role related to the inventory, but the extent of this role 
differs in the various assumptions and frameworks.  
Information based models use the insights from the theory of adverse 
selection and focus on how prices are connected to information. Bagehot (1971) is 
the origin of the information models. He allows for information costs and argues 
it can affect bid-ask spread. In his paper, market makers know that some investors 
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are better informed. He argues that these informed investors buy when they know 
that the current asset price is underpriced. They sell when they know it is 
overpriced. Or, they can simply choose to not trade. Since market makers must 
always quote prices to buy and sell, it follows that, on average, they always lose if 
they are trading with an informed investor. Consequently, market makers must 
have a pricing strategy to remain solvent. Essentially, the bid-ask spread reflects a 
balancing of losses to the informed investors with gains from the uninformed 
investors. Other early information based models include Copeland and Galai 
(1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). They formalize this concept of 
information costs. Recent papers that study the effect of information asymmetry 
on the asset prices include Wang (1993) and  Garleanu and Pedersen (2004). 
Wang (1993) finds that a larger fraction of less-informed investors is associated 
with higher required asset returns. His reasoning is that less-informed investors 
drive up total asset return volatility, which reduces consumption smoothing and 
risk sharing, therefore, raising the average risk premium. Garleanu and Pedersen 
(2004) model a finite number of agents trade repeatedly. Some agent might 
receive private information about future payoffs. They show that bid-ask spreads 
due to such private information are a direct trading cost if some agents are more 
likely to be informed than others. Trading with an informed counterparty will end 
up with a loss. The marginal investor does not break even on average. Therefore, 
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the required asset return must be higher because of such expected net trading 
losses.  
In the fixed income literature, corporate bond returns have been widely 
studied. Initially, conventional structural models of default provide an intuitive 
framework for studying corporate bond pricing factors.  These models build on 
the original insights of Black and Scholes (1973). The key is that debt can be 
valued using contingent-claims analysis. In particular, from a contingent-claims 
standpoint, corporate bond prices are determined by a risk of default and the 
recovery rate in the event of default. However, empirically, Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Huang and Huang (2003)) show that these 
credit risk determinants proposed by structural form models can only explain a 
limited portion of the levels of and changes in the yield spread of corporate bonds 
over Treasury bonds. Liquidity based studies look beyond the pure contingent-
claims viewpoint and argue that liquidity may be a possible explanation for the 
failure of these structural models and affect corporate bond prices. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) is one of the pioneering theories on how liquidity affects 
required asset returns. The intuition of their argument is straightforward. Liquidity 
affects asset prices because investors require a compensation for bearing 
transaction costs, which need to be paid whenever the asset is traded. They 
suggest that the discounted value of this transaction cost is the proxy for the 
magnitude of illiquidity. There are numerous empirical studies that test these 
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theories. For instance, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find the effect of liquidity 
on corporate bond prices. Their study examines about 4000 U.S. corporate bonds 
and finds that more illiquid bonds earn higher yield spreads. Bao, Pan, and Wang 
(2010) use TRACE data to study liquidity effects focusing in particular on a 
measure similar to the Roll measure. They find that the illiquidity in corporate 
bonds is much larger than what can be explained by bid-ask spreads, which is 
frequently used as a liquidity proxy in corporate bond market. Bongaerts, De Jong 
and Driessen (2012) use an asset pricing approach and find strong effects of 
liquidity level and liquidity risk on corporate bond prices. Dick-Nielsen, 
Feldhutter and Lando (2012) find that liquidity impacts are much larger during the 
subprime crisis for corporate bonds. Feldhutter (2012) uses price differences 
between small and large trades to identify liquidity crisis in the corporate bond 
market. Another related question is the relative importance of liquidity and credit 
risk in determining corporate bond pricing. The current evidence is still mixed. 
On the one hand, Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use credit default swap data 
to provide direct measures of the size of the default and non-default components 
in yield spread. They find that the majority of the corporate spread is due to 
default risk. On the other hand, Huang and Huang (2003) report that default risk 





DATA AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Data 
We use corporate bond transactions reported on FINRA’s Trace database. 
It reports key trading information, such as security identifiers, transaction dates, 
transaction times, transaction prices, trade direction (dealer buy, dealer sell or 
interdealer trade) and trade quantities. There are two different versions of Trace 
data.  In the version of these data used by most studies (henceforth publicly 
disseminated Trace), trade quantities are truncated and trade direction is only 
available from the beginning of November 2008. Specifically, publicly 
disseminated Trace truncates trade quantities at $5 million and $1million in par 
value for investment grade and high-yield bonds, respectively. The version of 
Trace that we employ, however, contains precise trade quantities and trade 
direction for the entire period. Unfortunately, we are not able to access this 
version of Trace for the period after December 31 2008. Hence, we use the 
publicly disseminated Trace to extend our sample period to June 30 2010. We 
apply the data filters in Dick-Nielsen (2009), deleting duplicate trades, reversal 
trades, canceled trades and trades subsequently corrected by dealers. Specifically, 
our first filter is duplicate trades, in every business day, we delete any 
duplications using an intra-day unique message sequence number. Second, in 
TRACE, a variable called ASOF_CD indicates if the transaction being reported is 
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an As/Of trade or Reversal from a prior business day. We delete all reports 
marked as  reversal trades and their corresponding original reports. In our sample, 
there are 1,034,634 trades marked as reversal trades. Finally, there are same-day 
trade cancellation and trade correction in TRACE. If TRC_ST indicates it is a 
cancelation (1,194,369 cases in our sample), both this report and the original 
cancelled report are deleted.  If it is a correction (874,874 cases in our sample), 
we  delete only the original incorrect report. Obviously misreported trades (e.g. 
trade with negative bond prices) are also excluded even if such errors are not 
identified by Trace. We further exclude trades if trade prices or bond yields are 
missing (6,751,430 cases in our sample). Our final sample consists 68,115,697 
trades.  
In addition to the Trace data, we use CRSP and COMPUSTAT to obtain 
stock returns and leverage ratios for bond issuers. Issue and issuer specific 
variables such as age, maturity, issue amount, and credit ratings are from the 
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). We use Datastream to collect 
information on CDS prices and Barclays US Corporate Bond Indices. Treasury 
bond yields for a range of maturities are from the Federal Reserve website, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov. We obtain information on the VIX from CBOE. 





The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds 
Table 1. The Illiquidity of Corporate Bonds 
Panel A: Number of Bonds within Trading Frequency 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No trade 53% 38% 35% 31% 39% 43% 47% 52% 61% 
1-5 days 12% 15% 14% 16% 13% 13% 15% 8% 8% 
5-50 days 24% 26% 30% 32% 28% 27% 24% 21% 19% 
50-150 days 12% 14% 14% 14% 13% 11% 9% 12% 12% 
150-200 days -    3% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 3% -            
>200 days -            4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 4% -          
Total Issues 32,601 32,311 32,708 33,571 35,706 40,022 41,243 37,044 38,472 
          Panel B: Market Value of Bonds ((in Billions of $) within Trading Frequency  
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
No trade 39% 27% 25% 23% 29% 31% 38% 38% 59% 
1-5 days  7% 9% 9% 9% 10% 11% 10% 5% 5% 
5-50 days 24% 22% 27% 29% 26% 27% 23% 19% 18% 
50-150 days 31% 19% 19% 20% 17% 16% 13% 15% 17% 
150-200 days -                7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 7% -               
>200 days -              16% 15% 13% 12% 9% 11% 16% -                 
Total Market 
Value 4,471 5,005 5,320 5,578 6,364 7,032 6,556 6,463 6,511 
 
Table 1 shows the distribution of trading for all US corporate bonds in 
FISD from July 2002 to June 2010. We define the frequency of trading of an issue 
as the number of distinct trading days in each year for that issue. In Panel A, we 
report the number of issues corresponding to a particular trading frequency 
category, as a fraction of the total number of corporate bonds. For example, in 
2008, number of issues which traded for more than 200 days accounts for 3% of 
the FISD corporate bond population. On average, the percentage of most liquid 
bonds (i.e. those that trade more than 200 days in a year), constitute about 3-4% 
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of the bond universe. A large proportion of the bonds (about 45%) do not even 
trade once a year. 
Panel B shows the total market value of issues corresponding to a 
particular trading frequency category, as a fraction of the total market value of the 
FISD corporate bond population. We define market value as the bond’s year-end 
trading price times bonds outstanding. If a price is not available, we use the 
bond’s par value as an approximation.  The market value of issues which trade 
over 200 days in a year ranges from 9% to 16% of total corporate bond market 
value. This is not surprising because bonds with larger size normally trade more 
often. Overall, regardless of whether one uses the number of bonds or their 
market value as a yard-stick, it is apparent that the vast majority of the corporate 
bond population is highly illiquid.  
Corporate bonds are be much more illiquid during the crisis period. For 
example, Panel A shows that from 2003 to 2006, roughly 33% of total bond 
population belongs to “No trade in year” group. During the post 2007 period of 
financial turmoil, this number jumps to about 50%. We observe similar pattern in 
market value from Panel B. Such variations make it particularly interesting to 






Sample Summary Statistics 
TRACE became available on July 1 2002, but we drop the first six months 
of the data due to data quality concerns.  Thus, our sample period is from January 
2003 to June 2010. Further, if a bond is held by dealers for a very long holding 
period, dealers could be thought of as long term buy-and-hold investors or 
perhaps engaged in proprietary trading, rather than as liquidity providers. Because 
we primarily focus on the trades when dealers provide immediacy/liquidity, we 
also drop such trades. 
Table 2. Summary Statistics 
 
Panel A: Most Liquid Sample Panel B: Full Sample 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
Par Value (in Millions of $) 958 792 646 216 25 312 
Rating (Aaa=1,…, C=21) 5.68 5.54 1.99 6.74 6.29 3.68 
Maturity (in Years) 6.59 4.42 1.89 7.32 4.25 6.00 
Age (in Years) 3.07 2.61 2.86 5.29 3.51 4.03 
Number of Trades Per Month 224 140 238 32 8 93 
Monthly Volatility (%) 2.72 2.13 2.78 4.52 3.13 3.69 
Number of bonds 792     16,928 
   
Given the difficulties with data availability prior to the introduction of 
Trace, most studies use the Fixed Income (or Warga) Database, Bloomberg 
Corporate Bonds Database or other proprietary databases.  Such datasets typically 
focus on the most liquid bonds in the marketplace.  Even studies that use Trace 
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data are often forced to restrict their analysis to bonds that trade frequently.  For 
example, Bao et al. (2010) require that a bond must trade on at least 75% of days 
in a calendar year to be included in their sample. In contrast, the above-described 
restrictions imposed in our sampling procedure are minimal.  To understand the 
sampling differences (and their potential consequences for the results), in table 2 
we provide some descriptive statistics on our sample, as well as a “most liquid 
bond” sample.  The latter simply requires that a bond exist in Trace for at least 
one full year, and trade in 200 days of a year.  
On average, there are 16,928 bonds every year in our sample, representing 
about 85% of traded corporate bonds. In the most liquid bond sample, on average, 
there are only 792 bonds every year, accounting for 4% of traded corporate bonds. 
The bonds in our sample are much smaller, with a median issuance size of $25 
million. In contrast, the median issuance size of a typical bond in the most liquid 
sample is $792 million. Bonds in our sample are also about 2 years older. The 
average (median) age of bonds in our sample is 5.3 (3.5) years. For the most 
liquid bond sample, the average (median) age of bonds is 3.1 (2.6) years. This is 
expected since younger bonds are typically more liquid. We do not see significant 
difference in maturity and bond rating between these two samples. Perhaps most 
obviously, and unsurprisingly, the median number of trades per month of bonds in 
our sample is 8, compared to 140 for the most liquid sample.  Finally table 2 
shows that the returns of bonds in our sample are more volatile, with a median 
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monthly volatility of 3.13%, compared to 2.13% for the most liquid bond sample. 
Broadly speaking, our sample is representative of the US corporate bond market, 
in terms of the number of issues, bond characteristics and trading characteristics. 
For the most liquid sample, there is a bias towards more liquid, larger, younger, 




ILLIQUIDITY MEASURES AND PROPERTIES 
Illiquidity Measures 
It is difficult to define a single measure to capture all aspects of liquidity. 
In this subsection, we first describe a number of commonly used liquidity 
measures.  
For bond i, Volumei is one of the simplest measures of liquidity, which is 
defined as the total trading volumes in certain period for this bond. Volumei,t is 




The Amihud (2002) liquidity measure follows Kyle (1984)’s concept of 
liquidity, the response of price to order flow. For bond i, Amihudi is defined as 
the average ratio of the absolute return to the trading volume in certain period. 
There are n+1 trades in this period, Returni,t and Volumei,t are the return and 




Waiting time between subsequent trades is another commonly used 
liquidity proxy. Intuitively, longer waiting time implies less liquid. For bond i, 
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Waitingtimei is defined as the average waiting time in certain period. There are 
n+1 trades in this period, tradetimei,t is the trading time for bond i and tth trade.  
Waitingtimei= 1n�(Tradetimei,t − Tradetimei,t−1)n+1
t=2
 
Flow ratio essentially combines quantity and time aspects of liquidity. 
Larger flow ratio implies the asset is more liquid. For bond i, Flowratioi is defined 
as the average trading volume divided by the waiting time between two 
consequent trades in certain period. There are n+1 trades in this period, 
tradetimei,t and Volumei,t are the trading time and trading volume for bond i and 
tth trade. 
Flowratioi= 1n� Volumei,t(Tradetimei,t − Tradetimei,t−1)n+1
t=2
 
 Bao, Pan and Wang (2010) use the negative of the autocovariance of 
relative price changes as a proxy for liquidity, λ. Their measure is based on Roll 
(1984). Under certain assumptions, transitory price movements reflect bid-ask 
bounces or the round trip costs, therefore, essentially, their measure can be 
interpreted as another version of effective bid-ask spread. More precisely, their 
measure is defined as the following formula.  
λi=-COV(∆Pricei,t,∆Pricei,t+1 ) 
In our paper, we propose two simple and robust measures of liquidity: 
dealers inventory holding period and the associated price markup. We measure 
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dealer inventory holding period as the difference between dealers’ purchase date 
and the corresponding resale date using a first-in-first-out (FIFO) method. 
Markup is the difference between dealers’ purchase price and the resale price, 
divided by the midpoint of purchase price and the resale price. More formally, for 






PurchaseDatei represents dealers’ purchase date of bond i, ResaleDatei is 
the corresponding resale date. Similarly, PurchasePricei and ResalePricei refer to 
dealers’ purchase price and matched resale price of bond i respectively.  
An example helps illustrate the intuition behind the measures.  On Feb. 04, 
2003, dealers bought 4,000,000 shares of Bond “A.GB” from investors at a price 
of $ 96.106, and then sold 3,543,000 shares on the same day at a price of $ 96.142, 
and 457,000 shares on the next day at a price of $ 97.111. For the first sale, on 
Feb. 04, 2003, the daily holding period is 1 day and the corresponding daily 
markup is 0.04%. For the second sale, on Feb. 05, 2003, the daily holding period 
is 2 days and the corresponding daily markup is 1.04%. We define monthly 
liquidity measures for any bond i as the value weighted-average of daily holding 
periods and markups within the month. For instance, if there is no other trades in 
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the month, the monthly markup and holding period for Bond “A.GB” in Feb. 
2003 should be 0.15% and 1.11 days. 
Table 3. Measures of Illiquidity 
Panel A: Dealers’ Holding Period (in days) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Full 
Mean 9.49 11.89 12.01 11.78 12.27 13.78 13.69 10.79 11.79 
Median 2.27 1.83 2.16 2.35 2.76 2.64 2.88 2.04 2.49 
SD 18.93 21.35 21.50 21.08 21.51 23.14 24.08 7.47 18.67 
           
 Panel B: Dealer Markup(%) 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Full 
Mean 1.51 1.16 1.09 1.24 1.17 1.56 2.47 1.92 1.50 
Median 0.91 0.74 0.64 0.75 0.80 1.19 1.41 0.75 0.91 
SD 5.91 4.86 3.23 2.69 2.76 5.82 7.29 3.87 4.76 
 
Panel C:  Illiquidity Measures and Bond Characteristics 
 
         Holding Period  Markup 
   Liquid Sample  Full sample  Liquid Sample  Full sample  
Constant 5.43 7.13 1.52 1.47 
 
2.74  10.41 6.86  8.25 
Size -0.49 -0.82 -0.23 -0.29 
 
-2.43  -5.24 -6.87 -17.05 
Rating 0.08 0.31 -0.01 0.06 
 
0.37  0.42 -0.81 3.52 
Maturity 0.79 0.32 0.04 0.04 
 
4.78 6.16 5.81 4.28 
Age 0.51 0.69 0.03 0.01 
 
2.71  19.26 3.33 3.21 
Number of Trades -0.011 -0.032 -0.002 0.001 
 
-2.44  -8.13 -2.98 1.08 




Panel D: Correlation  
        
 









HP 1.000 0.344 -0.065 0.463 -0.360 -0.151 0.582 0.151 -0.225 
MU 
 
1.000 0.042 0.727 -0.463 0.080 0.703 0.457 -0.165 
Volume 
  
1.000 0.083 0.607 0.227 -0.004 0.074 0.701 
Amihud 
   
1.000 -0.471 0.115 0.936 0.663 -0.167 
Wating Time 
    
1.000 -0.233 -0.561 -0.503 0.799 
Flow Ratio 
     
1.000 -0.004 0.739 -0.061 
λ 
      
1.000 0.736 -0.235 
ID Trades 
       
1.000 -0.189 
ID Volume 
        
1.000 
 
Table 3 summarizes our illiquidity measures. In each year, we report mean, 
median, and standard deviation as the time-series averages of the cross-sectional 
means, medians and standard deviations. Focusing first on Panel A, which reports 
descriptive statistics of holding period, the median (mean) dealer holding period is 
between 1.83 (9.49) days to 2.88 (13.78) days from 2003 through 2010. 
Interestingly, the median holding period during the crisis period (2007-2009) is 
much larger than it is in the non-crisis period, jumping from 2.1 days to 2.8 days. 
Panel B reports descriptive statistics on markup. The median (mean) markup is 
between 0.64% (1.09%) and 1.41% (2.47%) for the entire sample period. As a 
point of comparison, Green, Hollifield, and Schurhoff (2006) find that median 
markups are between 1.3% and 2% in municipal bond market between 2000 and 
2003. One potential reason that markup is higher in municipal bond market is that 
municipal bonds are even more illiquid. For example, they report that, from 
March 1998 to May 1999, 71% of the outstanding issues did not trade at all. The 
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median markup also jumps from 0.7% in the non-crisis period to about 1.2% in 
the crisis period. Standard deviations are much larger in crisis periods as well, 
indicating that the effects of liquidity are very different during the crisis period.  
 
Illiquidity, Bond Characteristics, and Market Conditions 
We start with an assessment of the two measures and examine their 
connections with key bond characteristics. Age, maturity, size, credit rating, and 
number of trades are often linked to bond liquidity (for example, Houweling, 
Mentink, and Vorst (2005)). Table 3 Panel C reports monthly Fama-MacBeth 
cross-sectional regressions with holding period and markup as the dependent 
variables on the most liquid sample, and full sample. In both samples, older bonds 
with smaller issuance size and longer maturity have higher markups and longer 
holding periods. The relationship between credit rating and our measures is 
almost insignificant for all regressions, implying that our illiquidity measures are 
not correlated with individual bond credit risks. More interestingly, the overall 
explanatory power of these traditional liquidity measures is rather low, only 4% 
for holding period and 10% for markup. This implies that a large portion of our 
measures is not explained by conventional liquidity proxies. Table 3 Panel D 
reports the correlations of our measures, other commonly used liquidity measures 
and inter dealer trading information. We find that our measures are positively 
correlated with Amihud measure, the λ measure and the number of inter-dealer 
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trades (ID trades) and negatively correlated with inter-dealer trading volume (ID 
Volume). More inter-dealer trades are associated with more transaction costs, 
therefore markup is larger. ID trades and ID Volume are negatively correlated. 
There are several possibilities, for instance, higher ID trades might imply that the 
buying dealer cannot lay off inventory on his own, so he has to push it to other 
dealers because of illiquidity. 
We also examine the time series variation in these liquidity measures. We 
are particularly interested in this because systematic component of bond 
illiquidity emerges when many bonds become illiquid at the same time. If bond-
level illiquidity is driven by a systematic component, rather than purely 



































































































Figure 1: Monthly Time-Series of Illiquidity Measures 
We first construct monthly cross sections of individual bonds holding 
periods and markups and then calculate cross-sectional medians and value 
weighted means. Figure 1 shows that in the time series our illiquidity measures 
comove strongly with the aggregate market condition variables, particularly 
expected volatility (as measured by VIX). Their comovement during the 2008 
financial crisis is especially noteworthy. Focusing first on markup, we see that in 
September 2007, when the subprime industry started collapse, markups almost 
doubled from their pre-crisis average, from around 0.64% to 1.05%. In October 
2008, right after the Lehman bankruptcy and the bailout of AIG, markups 
quadrupled and reached 2.42%. We find similar pattern for holding period in the 
same period. Subsequent to that, both measures decline, coinciding with funding 























































Figure 2: Trading Volume, Markup and Holding Period 
 Trading quantity, price and time are the three very basic elements of all 
trading. They have captured the interest and attention of researchers. In our study, 
markup and holding period essentially measure the price and time aspects of a 
trade. Quantity can be measured by trading volume. Figure 2 reports their 
relationship . In every year, we divide all trades into 20 groups based on dealer 
resale trading volume. Then, we calculate the value weighted average markup and 
holding period for each group. Overall, we can see that larger trading volume is 
associated with smaller markup. Negotiation power of institutional investors for 
large trades might contribute to such negative relation between trade size and 
markup. Also, we can see that longer inventory holding period is associated with 
larger markup. This is consistent with the view that dealers require higher return 
30 
 
for taking more risks. There are 2 outliers with high markup. One potential 
explanation is that some factors that directly determine markup of these bonds 
play a role here. For instance, these bonds might share some particular bond 
characteristics which are different with bonds of other groups.  
Table 4. Illiquidity, Market Conditional Variables and Flight to Quality 
Panel A: Putting VIX into regression 
 














Constant 4.81 5.58 4.61 4.97 0.20 0.39 0.79 0.31 
 
15.92 18.56 9.44 25.53 2.63 3.63 6.13 5.59 
ᅀVIXt 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
 
2.13 2.51 5.18 3.65 8.44 4.23 3.03 4.47 
ᅀCDS 
indext 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 
 
0.82 1.01 0.05 0.72 1.18 1.84 0.61 0.67 
ᅀTerm 
Spreadt -0.38 -0.50 0.20 -0.64 -0.13 -0.05 -0.30 -0.10 
 
-2.27 -3.05 0.73 -6.64 -3.18 -0.78 -4.17 -3.36 
SP500 
Returnt -8.54 -7.08 -6.07 -3.74 -2.15 -1.61 -5.07 -2.96 
 
-2.24 -1.87 -0.99 -1.53 -2.21 -1.19 -3.11 -4.20 
Adj. R2  28.50 32.09 29.18 29.46 58.30 46.69 40.59 45.64 
 
Panel B: Putting TED spread into regression 
 














Constant 4.23 5.03 4.26 4.70 0.53 0.63 0.94 0.58 
 
19.85 23.94 13.44 36.29 8.96 8.27 11.07 15.09 
ᅀTED 
spreadt 0.05 0.15 1.01 0.66 0.26 0.31 0.38 0.35 
 
3.84 4.30 7.18 6.72 6.26 3.29 3.53 8.83 
ᅀCDS 
indext 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
 
1.51 1.46 0.81 0.88 1.41 0.39 -1.22 -1.24 
ᅀTerm 
Spreadt -0.64 -0.73 0.19 -0.68 0.06 0.09 -0.19 0.06 
 
-4.49 -5.21 0.91 -7.86 1.40 1.73 -3.25 2.34 
SP500 
Returnt -3.32 -1.98 -0.51 -1.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.44 -0.22 
 
-0.95 -0.57 -0.87 -1.30 -1.08 -1.03 -3.17 -1.93 
Adj. R2 21.38 26.41 27.60 25.19 45.80 40.14 43.81 41.65 
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Table 4 panel A reports the connection between these measures and 
broader market conditions more formally. We regress monthly changes in holding 
period and markup on contemporaneous changes in the VIX, a CDS index, and 
the term spread and the S&P500 index return. We define the CDS index as the 
equally weight average of five-year corporate CDS spreads covered in Datastream. 
We compute the term spread as the difference between the rates of the 10 year 
Treasury bond and the 90-day T-bill. For the full sample, VIX has a slope 
coefficient of 0.10 (0.03) with a t-stat of 3.65(4.47) for holding period (markup). 
This connection is not driven just by bond quality: the positive relation remains 
even if we divide the bonds into 3 groups based on their credit ratings. Our results 
suggest that illiquidity in the corporate bond market and shocks to stock market 
risk and/or risk appetite are tightly connected. We do not see a significant positive 
relation between changes in our illiquidity measures and changes in the CDS 
index, echoing earlier results that our measures do not contain much credit 
information. 
In panel B, regressions of bond illiquidity on TED spread provide the 
direct evidence of the connection between market liquidity and funding liquidity 
in the corporate bond market. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) predict that the 
ability of liquidity-suppliers to provide liquidity depends on their financing 
constraints. The slope of the TED spread coefficient is indeed positive and 
significant in all specifications after controlling various other market condition 
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variables.  This suggests that funding costs, as proxied by the TED spread, explain 
time variation in the liquidity that dealers provide. Another important testable 
prediction of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) is that when funding becomes 
scarce, liquidity provision is especially reduced for more risky assets. They use 
the term “flight to quality” to refer to such phenomena. We test this prediction by 
examining the relation between funding constraints and the liquidity of bonds 
with different credit ratings. We find that the slope coefficients of TED spread are 
positive and statistically significant, and, more importantly, monotonically 
increasing from high quality bonds to low quality bonds. For holding period, the 
F-value for a joint test of significance confirms that coefficients differ across three 
groups (F-value 3.83). For markup, regression coefficients between low quality 
bonds and high quality bonds are statistically different (F-value is 2.47). Overall, 
our results here suggest that the liquidity of low credit rating bonds is more 
sensitive to borrowing costs than is the liquidity of high credit rating bonds.  
Overall, our analysis shows the existence of substantial commonality in 
the time series variation of corporate bond illiquidity. This variation is correlated 
with overall market conditions, particularly VIX and TED spread. Further, the 
significance of such correlation changes systematically cross bonds with different 
credit ratings. These findings provide direct and strong evidence that supports 
links between liquidity supplier behavior, capital limitations, and liquidity 




ASSET PRICING IMPLICATIONS OF ILLIQUIDITY 
Aggregate Corporate Bond Prices and Illiquidity 
Table 5. Time Series Regression of Changes in Aggregate Bond Yield on 
Changes in Illiquidity Measures 
 
Full Sample Period Non-Crisis Sample Period Crisis Sample Period 
Constant 0.92 0.04 0.98 0.12 0.79 0.12 0.93 0.11 0.43 0.04 0.41 0.08 
 
6.23 2.98 7.87 3.96 6.03 2.05 7.46 2.16 5.62 1.83 6.06 2.53 
ᅀ Holding 
Period 0.02 0.02 
 
  0.01 0.01 
 





  2.27 1.11 
 
  2.62 2.79 
  ᅀMarkup 0.35 0.37 
 
  0.23 0.21 
 





  4.85 4.49 
 
  7.03 6.80 
  ᅀ Composite 
illiquidity   
 













ᅀ λ   0.73 
 








  10.30 
 







ᅀ CDS Index   0.28 
 








  4.89 
 







ᅀ Slope   -0.38 
 








  -4.08 
 







ᅀ VIX   0.00 
 








  -0.29 
 







SP500 Return   -0.02 
 








  -7.13 
 








rate   -0.15 
 








  -2.89 
 







∆Convexity   0.01 
 







    0.66 
 
0.47   0.17   0.06   0.14   0.12 
Adj. R2 18.96 46.82 18.33 44.86 11.61 38.24 5.15 33.13 29.30 55.85 24.52 55.83 
 
Now we examine whether our liquidity measures are relevant for bond 
pricing in the time series and cross-section. Table 5 reports time series regressions 
with monthly changes in aggregate US corporate bond yield spreads as the 
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dependent variable. Yield spreads are defined as the difference between the yield 
of Barclay Intermediate U.S. Corporate Bond index (formerly known as the 
Lehman Index) and the yield of the 5-year treasury constant maturity series. We 
regress monthly yield spread changes on monthly changes in the illiquidity 
measures, market condition variables and other control variables. We also divide 
the sample into non-crisis periods and crisis periods to examine if illiquidity has 
larger effects on bond spread changes during the crisis period. We control for the 
illiquidity measure used in Bao, Pan and Wang (2010), the negative 
autocovariance of price changes (λ). We follow Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and 
Martin (2001) in using slope and convexity as additional explanatory variables, 
where the slope of the yield curve is the difference between yields of 10-year and 
2-year treasury constant maturity series, and convexity is the squared level of the 
yield of 10-year treasury constant maturity series. Finally, to speed up a trade, 
sellers can always give substantially price concessions, or vice verse, hence 
holding period and markup might be jointly determined, we construct a composite 
illiquidity measure that is the sum of z-scores of holding period and markup.  
Time series regressions show that illiquidity is an important factor in 
explaining the variation of the US aggregate yield spreads. For the full sample 
period, a regression on holding period and markup alone has an adjusted R2 of 
19%. Adding an index of CDS prices, VIX, and other proxies and determinants of 
credit risk increases the adjusted R2 to 46%, suggesting that illiquidity and credit 
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risk are equally important in explaining yield spreads. The coefficient on holding 
period (markup) is 0.02 (0.35) with a t-stat of 2.49 (5.72). This implies that an 
increase of holding period (markup) by 1 day (100 bps) is associated with an 
increase of 2 bps (35 bps) of aggregate yield spread. Among the non-liquidity 
variables, the CDS index, slope, S&P500 index return, and treasury rate all play 
important roles with significant coefficients. On the other hand, VIX is 
statistically insignificant. This implies that despite the strong correlation between 
VIX and our liquidity measures evident from table 4, our illiquidity measures 
contain important information about bond yield spreads beyond VIX. Further, we 
do not see potential nonlinear effects due to convexity since the coefficient on the 
convexity variable is statistically insignificant. Finally, consistent with the 
findings of Bao, Pan and Wang (2010), we find that λ is also significant in the 
time series regression.  
Separating the full sample period into crisis period and non-crisis period, 
we find that the relative importance of illiquidity and credit risk changes 
dramatically in the crisis period. During the non-crisis period, illiquidity effects 
are over-shadowed by credit risk: regressions of aggregate US corporate bond 
yield spreads on illiquidity proxies alone have an adjusted R2 of 12% and 
combining credit risk increases the adjusted R2 to around 38%. In the crisis period, 
adjusted R2 for illiquidity alone triple to around 30%, larger than the combined 
additional explanatory power (25%) of all other factors. In addition, US aggregate 
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yield spreads are more sensitive to illiquidity in the crisis period than in the 
normal periods.  The coefficients of both holding period and markup double in the 
crisis period. These results are similar whether we use holding period and markup 
as illiquidity proxies, or use the composite illiquidity proxy.  
 
Bond-Level Illiquidity and Individual Bond Prices 
We now study the extent to which bond-level illiquidity measures affect 
individual bond prices. We focus on the yield spread of individual bonds, the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the Treasury bond yield of the 
same maturity. We perform monthly Fama-MacBeth regressions of individual 
bond yield spreads on illiquidity proxies, along with a set of control variables. 
The t-values are calculated with Newey-West adjustments (3 lags).  
Table 6. Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Bond Yield Spreads on Illiquidity 
Measures 
 
Full Crisis Non-Crisis Full Crisis Non-Crisis 
Constant 5.53 3.65 2.68 0.88 5.97 4.08 6.87 -1.43 4.90 1.09 7.17 -1.82 
 
6.27 0.57 2.02 1.62 6.61 2.49 3.74 -0.69 2.02 1.33 4.00 -1.38 
Holding 
Period 0.008 0.004 0.025 0.017 0.005 0.002 
  
    
  
 
4.78 0.86 3.39 2.53 4.96 0.09 
  
    
  Markup 0.51 0.27 0.95 0.57 0.44 0.22 
  
    
  
 
5.04 4.36 2.94 3.06 5.08 4.56 
  
    
  Composite 
illiquidity     
  
    0.13 0.08 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.07 
 
    
  
    3.11 2.70 2.53 2.41 3.20 4.27 
Size   -0.65 
 
-1.74   -0.48 
 




  -1.89 
 
-1.34   -0.13 
 
-1.96   -1.72 
 
-0.92 
Rating   0.64 
 
1.48   0.51 
 




  3.37 
 
2.48   3.76 
 





Maturity   -0.37 
 
-0.79   -0.30 
 




  -0.70 
 
-0.32   -2.62 
 
-0.25   -0.81 
 
-0.18 
Age   -0.12 
 
-0.81   -0.02 
 




  -0.67 
 
-0.74   -1.06 
 
-0.05   -0.11 
 
-0.94 









  -2.74 
 
-2.60   -3.44 
 




Months   90   12   78   90   12   78 
Adj. R2 19.44 41.67 27.59 55.32 18.19 39.57 14.12 40.34 24.21 56.77 12.57 37.81 
# of bonds   13356   13645   13312   13356   13645   13312 
 
Table 6 shows the regression results. The average number of bonds in 
each month is over 13,000. The regressions show that holding periods and 
markups together significantly explain the cross-section variation of individual 
bond prices in both economic and statistical terms. For the full sample period, the 
coefficient on holding period (markup) is around 0.01 (0.51) with a t-stat of 4.78 
(5.04). This implies that if one bond has a holding period (markup) that is higher 
than another bond by 1 day (100 bps), the yield spread of this bond is on average 
1 bp (51bps) higher. To put an increase of 1 day (100 bps) in holding period 
(markup) in context, a one standard deviation difference in holding periods 
(markup) implies a difference in yield spreads of 11 (128) bps. In the crisis period, 
the coefficient on holding period (markup) jumps to 0.025 (0.95) with a t-stat of 
3.39 (2.94). In economic terms, during the crisis period, a one standard deviation 
difference in holding period (markup) leads to a difference in yield spreads as 
much as 32 (271) bps. Adjusted R2 are also higher during the crisis period, 
increasing from 40% to 55%.  
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We also use credit ratings to control for the fundamental risk of a bond. 
Credit ratings are important in explaining yield spreads for all regression 
specifications. As shown in Table 6, the slope coefficient on credit rating is 0.51 
(1.48) with a t-stat of 3.76 (2.48) in non-crisis period (crisis period). Since some 
bond characteristics, such as age, issuance size, and maturity, are known to be 
linked to bond liquidity, we include them as control variables. The overall 
positive and significant connection between our measures and bond yield spreads 
is unchanged despite the inclusion of these variables. Moreover, many of these 
conventional illiquidity proxies are either statistically insignificant or have the 
wrong sign. Our results remain robust if we use the composite illiquidity proxy. 
Table 6 shows that the coefficient on it is statistically significant across all the 





THE CREDIT SPREAD PUZZLE 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Huang and Huang 
(2003) report that credit risk determinants proposed by traditional structural 
models can only explain about 25% of levels of or changes in credit spreads of 
corporate bonds. Intriguingly, Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) find the regression 
residuals are highly cross-correlated and driven by a common systematic 
component. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) suggest that illiquidity may be an 
additional determinant of the credit spread variation. Empirical attempts at using 
illiquidity proxies to explain credit spread changes have had limited success. For 
example, Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find that changes in their three liquidity 
proxies, bid-ask spreads, percentage of zero returns and the LOT (Lesmond et al. 
(1999)) liquidity estimate, are significantly and positively related to changes in 
the credit spread.2
We start by simply replicating the original regressions of Collin-Dufresne, 




i (∆r10)2+β4i ∆Slope 
 However, their combined adjusted R2s of the full regression 
models are rather low, about 15% for investment grade bonds. 
                                                 
2  LOT liquidity estimate is based on the limited dependent variable model proposed by Lesmond 
et al. (1999). They argue that a liquidity cost threshold exists because bond prices will reflect new 
information only if the information value of the marginal trader exceeds the total liquidity costs. 







Credit.Spread is the difference between the yield of bond and the 
associated yield of the Treasury curve at the same maturity. Ret is the issuer’s 
monthly equity return. r10 is the monthly series of 10-year treasury rate, and the 
square of this, (r10)2, proxies for convexity. Slope is the difference between 10-
year and 2-year treasury constant maturity yields. VIX is the VIX index. Jump 
refers to the probability and magnitude of a large negative jump in firm value, and 
is constructed from S&P 500 futures options following the procedure in Collin-
Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001). Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin 
(2001) also apply several data filters. They use only noncallable and nonputtable 
industrial corporate bonds with more than four years to maturity. Additionally, 
they require a bond to have at least 25 monthly observations in order to enter the 
sample. These data filters dramatically reduce the number of bonds available to 
measure credit spread changes. 
Table 7. Determinants of Credit Spread Changes by Rating Group 
 Panel A: Structural Model Determinants of Credit Spread Changes 
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
Constant 0.045 -0.158 0.364 0.190 -0.404 -0.190 0.081 0.995 -8.924 
 
1.21 -1.15 2.61 2.41 -2.55 -1.79 0.42 2.33 -2.86 
Stock Return -0.008 0.000 -0.037 -0.057 -0.064 -0.077 -0.069 -0.256 -0.118 
 
-0.60 -1.72 -1.84 -1.90 -3.93 -2.38 -2.20 -2.99 -3.21 
∆Treasury rate -0.012 -0.345 -0.590 -0.086 -0.295 -0.261 -0.144 -1.737 -1.948 
 
-1.95 -2.10 -2.08 -3.04 -3.59 -3.52 -3.23 -5.91 -6.76 
∆Convexity 0.047 -0.768 -0.240 -0.592 -1.265 -0.492 0.765 -0.833 -1.352 
 
0.41 -1.18 -0.82 -0.51 -1.11 -1.20 0.82 -2.03 -0.19 




-0.99 -2.70 -2.53 -2.48 -2.26 -0.59 -0.76 0.40 -0.70 
∆Volatility 0.004 0.075 0.004 0.019 0.022 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.049 
 
2.93 2.38 2.56 2.69 3.02 0.56 1.28 1.32 1.58 
S&P 500 -0.032 -0.274 -0.144 -0.043 -0.051 -0.143 -0.506 -0.169 0.291 
 
-2.15 -1.94 -2.23 -2.67 -2.20 -1.88 -6.21 -2.67 1.66 
∆Jump 0.001 0.016 0.004 0.001 0.009 0.003 0.144 0.057 0.015 
 
3.18 1.96 2.21 3.98 4.43 2.75 2.89 3.23 2.84 
       
  
  N 14 175 434 295 129 75  58  33  24 
Adj. R2 25% 31% 26% 30% 24% 23% 48% 76% 61% 
 
Panel B: Adding Individual Illiquidity Measures         
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
∆MU 0.282 0.302 0.231 0.220 0.292 0.205 0.776 0.181 0.478 
 
2.28 2.36 2.65 2.40 1.82 0.57 2.79 1.07 1.27 
       
  
  ∆HP 0.007 0.091 0.022 0.113 0.123 0.066 0.261 0.025 0.059 
 
0.76 2.82 1.55 2.64 0.86 2.44 2.24 0.81 1.49 
Adj. R2 32% 45% 36% 41% 40% 44% 59% 68% 56% 
       
  
  Panel C: Adding Composite Illiquidity Measure       
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
∆ Composite 
Illiquidity 0.012 0.015 0.009 0.079 0.014 0.006 0.015 0.003 0.014 
 
2.08 2.83 2.15 2.70 2.27 2.37 2.82 1.12 1.70 
Adj. R2 33% 40% 36% 39% 41% 44% 59% 67% 51% 
       
  
  Panel D: Percentage improvement in Adj. R2         
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
HP+MU 27% 46% 39% 36% 66% 89% 22% -10% -8% 
      
  
   Composite 
Illiquidity 32% 31% 38% 29% 68% 90% 23% -12% -17% 
          Table 7 panel A reports regression results of the original Collin-Dufresne, 
Goldstein and Martin (2001) model with bonds grouped by credit rating. For each 
of the bonds within a group, we estimate a time series regression and report cross-
sectional averages of estimated coefficients within the group. Collin-Dufresne, 
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Goldstein and Martin (2001) only study bonds rated from B to AAA because of 
data availability. Our data allows us to extend sample coverage to bond rating 
groups of CCC, CC, and C. Focusing first on bonds rated from B to AAA, which 
are covered in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), we find results 
similar to theirs. The variables suggested by structure models are significant both 
economically and statistically in explaining changes in individual bond credit 
spreads. However, they have rather limited explanatory power, with an adjusted 
R2 of about 27%. For low-rated (CCC through C) bonds, structural models alone 
explain over 60% of credit spread changes, suggesting that for this rating group, 
the “puzzle” is less of a puzzle. 
We now expand their original regression model to include 
contemporaneous changes in holding period and markup. Table 7 Panel B reports 
the regression results. For B to AAA rated bonds, changes in holding period and 
markup are generally positively associated with changes in credit spreads. The 
coefficient on markup ranges from about 0.21 to 0.30. It is statistically significant 
for all bond groups except B rated bonds. In economic term, an increase of 
markup by 100 bps is associated with an increase of about 25 bps of credit spread. 
The coefficient on holding period is statistically significant for AA, BBB, and B 
rated bonds. It is economically significant for these groups, so that a one day 
increase in holding period is associated with an increase of about 9 bps in the 
credit spread. More importantly, adding our measures increases average adjusted 
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R2 from 27% to 40%.3
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001) find that their regression 
residuals are highly cross-correlated. Their principal components analysis 
suggests the 75.9% of the residual variation is driven by the first component. 
They also report that including a list of additional independent variables (e.g. 
Fama and French factors, on-the-run minus off-the-run 30-year Treasury yields, 
leading effects of stocks on bonds and economic state variables) reduces the 
explanatory power of the first principal component to 58.5%. We study how much 
of the regression residuals are driven by the principal components after we add 
our liquidity proxies. Essentially, we ask if liquidity can explain this common 
systematic component in the CGM specifications. For each rating group, we 
calculate an average residual, and then undertake the principal components 
 This suggests that that liquidity is an important 
determinant of credit spread changes, beyond the pure contingent-claims 
framework (i.e. conventional structural models). While we cannot claim to “solve” 
the puzzle, our illiquidity measures make substantial progress. In Panel C, we 
combine holding period and markup into a composite illiquidity measure.  For B 
to AAA rated bonds, we can see that our composite liquidity proxy is significant 
for all bond groups. Adding the composite illiquidity measure increases average 
adjusted R2 to about 40%.  
                                                 
3 For lower rated bonds (between CCC and C), adding liquidity has a negligible effect on adjusted 
R2. Also, liquidity measures are statistically insignificant in most cases.  
44 
 
analysis and extract the principal components of the covariance matrix of these 
residuals. For bonds rated above B, we find that the first principal component 
accounts for 58.8% of the residual variance. Results here suggest that our liquidity 
proxies to some extent contribute to credit spread changes.  
In Panel D, we report percentage improvement in adjustment R2 after 
adding holding period and markup, or composite illiquidity measure respectively. 
For bonds rated from B to AAA, the percentage improvement in adjusted R2 is 
substantial. It ranges from around 30% to 90%, depending on rating groups. For 
credit spreads changes in B, BB, and AA groups, the corresponding percentage 
improvement in adjustment R2 is 89%, 66% and 46% respectively. For bond rated 
from CCC to C, our liquidity proxies do not provide additional explanatory power.  
Table 8. Crisis Effects on the Determinants of Credit Spread Changes by Rating 
Group 
Panel A: Additional Determinants of Credit Spread Changes-HP, MU, and Crisis  
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
∆MU 0.238 0.256 0.193 0.182 0.247 0.169 0.682 0.148 0.414 
 
2.03 2.11 2.36 2.14 1.62 0.27 2.50 0.94 1.07 
∆HP -0.009 0.066 0.012 0.085 0.095 0.044 0.219 0.007 0.037 
 
-0.10 2.52 1.37 1.93 0.06 1.86 1.99 0.35 0.63 
Crisis*∆MU 0.141 0.143 0.080 0.135 0.142 0.054 0.190 0.051 0.081 
 
2.34 1.87 1.90 1.87 2.62 1.21 2.72 0.14 0.16 
Crisis*∆HP 0.019 0.044 0.021 0.038 0.031 0.033 0.053 0.029 0.024 
 
0.89 2.30 1.77 1.88 1.30 2.66 1.84 1.14 1.77 
Crisis 0.180 -0.005 0.139 0.056 0.012 0.015 0.263 0.198 0.238 
 
0.98 -1.15 2.68 2.52 3.23 4.77 2.97 2.43 1.99 
Adj. R2 35% 47% 41% 45% 47% 51% 62% 75% 62% 
Crisis*∆MU/∆MU 59% 56% 41% 74% 57% 32% 28% 34% 20% 




Panel B: Additional Determinants of Credit Spread Changes-Composite Illiquidity, and Crisis  
  AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C 
∆ Composite 
Illiquidity 0.009 0.012 0.006 0.062 0.011 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.009 
 
1.78 2.58 2.72 1.89 0.52 2.67 2.46 1.32 1.12 
Crisis*∆ Composite 
Illiquidity 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.029 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.004 0.006 
 
2.84 2.14 1.64 1.80 2.72 2.09 2.45 1.68 1.08 
Crisis 0.006 -0.034 0.076 0.069 0.019 0.027 0.245 0.040 0.001 
 
0.89 -0.62 4.10 2.74 2.83 2.92 3.72 2.88 1.86 
Adj. R2 35% 45% 39% 41% 44% 50% 62% 68% 54% 
Additional Impact 56% 51% 83% 47% 45% 75% 61% 402% 67% 
 
Huang (2003) predicts that illiquidity has larger effects on asset returns 
when agents face liquidity shocks and borrowing constraints. In a recent paper, 
Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010) suggest a regime-switching pattern in the 
response of bond returns to liquidity. Their model implies that the impact of 
illiquidity might increase dramatically during the crisis period (their “stress” 
regime). We test the implications of these models and relate them to the credit 
spread puzzle. Particularly, we examine the crisis effects on the credit spread 
changes by expanding the regression model with interaction term of crisis and 
illiquidity measures, and crisis dummy. Table 8 Panel A and Panel B reports 
regression results using holding period and markup, and composite illiquidity 
measure respectively.  
Panel A shows that the crisis dummy is positively associated with changes 
of credit spread and statistically significant for all bonds rated below AA. Other 
things equal, the increase in credit spreads during the crisis period (over 20 bps) is 
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much bigger for bonds rated from CCC to C than it is for bonds rated above CCC 
(around 4 bps). More importantly, consistent with the predictions of Huang (2003) 
and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath (2010), there is a positive correlation between 
the interaction term of crisis and our illiquidity measures, and credit spread 
changes for bonds across all rating groups. Statistically, most of these interaction 
terms are significant at 10% significance level or above. They are also 
economically important because overall, the sensitivity of credit spread changes 
to liquidity changes is about 60% larger during crisis period. In panel B, we repeat 
the analysis using the composite illiquidity measure instead of holding period and 
markup. The results are largely similar.  
Table 9. Determinants of Credit Spread Changes by Leverage Group 
Panel A: Structural Model Determinants of Credit Spread Changes 
         <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
Intercept 0.042 0.024 0.016 0.011 0.032 0.020 
 
5.99 5.93 5.62 5.25 5.91 6.39 
∆leverage 0.007 0.003 0.015 0.007 0.010 0.011 
 
2.40 2.32 2.26 2.66 2.55 2.80 
∆Treasury rate -0.168 -0.187 -0.186 -0.416 -0.418 -0.402 
 
-4.93 -4.90 -5.03 -5.55 -5.17 -4.80 
∆Convexity 0.014 0.167 -0.005 -0.013 0.082 0.094 
 
0.09 0.14 -0.33 -0.65 0.09 0.13 
∆Slope 0.008 -0.015 0.010 -0.009 0.026 -0.010 
 
0.25 -0.13 0.37 -2.33 0.26 -1.63 
∆Volatility 0.008 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.005 0.005 
 
2.11 2.62 0.87 1.59 2.06 2.68 
S&P 500 -0.014 -0.028 -0.010 -0.034 -0.040 -0.026 
 
-5.08 -5.38 -5.17 -4.94 -5.24 -4.77 
∆Jump 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.003 
 
5.46 5.20 5.61 5.79 5.69 5.83 
N 130 167 181 147 199 386 




Panel B: Adding Individual Illiquidity Measures 
  <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
∆ MU 0.132 0.343 0.155 0.511 0.194 -0.033 
 
2.04 3.154 1.766 2.456 2.532 -0.506 
∆HP 0.025 0.022 0.022 0.034 0.014 -0.008 
 
1.64 2.88 1.69 2.55 1.17 -1.04 
Adj. R2 30% 44% 36% 49% 40% 36% 
       Panel C: Adding Composite Illiquidity 
  <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
∆ Composite 
Illiquidity 0.015 0.022 0.015 0.023 0.018 0.007 
 
2.14 3.31 2.168 3.164 2.44 1.64 
 Adj. R2 33% 41% 35% 43% 37% 37% 
       Panel D: Percentage improvement in Adj. R2  
  <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
HP+MU 29% 93% 5% 62% 58% 39% 
∆ Composite 
Illiquidity 44% 78% 3% 42% 49% 42% 
 
Table 10. Crisis Effects on the Determinants of Credit Spread Changes by 
Leverage Group 
Panel A: Additional Determinants of Credit Spread Changes-MU, HP, and Crisis 
  <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
∆ MU 0.104 0.293 0.119 0.444 0.159 0.044 
 
1.82 3.14 1.66 2.20 2.27 0.68 
∆HP 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.028 0.011 0.005 
 
1.476 2.592 1.514 2.297 1.051 0.935 
Crisis*∆ MU 0.081 0.147 0.071 0.146 0.065 0.019 
 
2.70 2.14 2.24 2.17 3.16 0.43 
Crisis*∆ HP 0.010 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.008 0.005 
 
2.66 2.57 1.98 2.07 1.57 1.74 
Crisis 0.035 0.059 0.001 0.002 0.041 0.113 
 
2.55 2.04 1.04 1.65 2.36 3.61 
 Adj. R2 37% 51% 39% 51% 47% 44% 
Crisis*∆ MU/∆ MU 78% 50% 60% 33% 41% 43% 




Panel B: Additional Determinants of Credit Spread Changes-Composite Illiquidity, and Crisis  
  <15% 15-25% 25-35% 35-45% 45-55% >55% 
∆ Composite Illiquidity 0.012 0.018 0.012 0.019 0.014 0.007 
 
1.92 3.14 1.99 2.84 2.19 1.34 
Crisis*∆ Composite Illiquidity 0.01 0.01 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.001 
 
2.75 2.41 2.36 2.43 2.31 0.87 
Crisis 0.002 0.011 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.021 
 
2.09 2.58 1.39 1.53 3.09 2.93 
 Adj. R2 34% 49% 37% 48% 44% 38% 
Additional Impact 81% 57% 67% 43% 49% 14% 
 
Finally, as noted in Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein and Martin (2001), the 
structural framework implies that credit spreads should increase with leverage 
since default is triggered when the leverage ratio approaches unity. Also, changes 
in leverage have often been used to proxy for changes in the firm’s health. Hence, 
for robustness, we also use changes of leverage, instead of firm’s stock return, as 
an explanatory variable. In table 9 and table 10, we use this approach and repeat 
the analysis in table 7 and table 8, grouping bonds by firms’ leverage ratios rather 
than credit ratings. Table 9 panel A shows that the adjusted R2 of the original 
model without our liquidity proxies is about 25%. Table 9 panels B and C show 
that adding our liquidity measures increases the adjusted R2 to around 40%. In 
table 9, panel D shows that leverage group of 15-25% has the biggest adjusted R2 
improvement, almost doubling from 22% to 44%. Regression results in table 10 






Building on the insights of Demsetz (1968) and Chacko, Jurek, and 
Stafford (2008), we link immediacy, liquidity, and prices in the corporate bond 
market. We construct dealers’ inventory holding periods and the associated price 
markups as liquidity proxies. Our measures allow us to cover a relatively 
comprehensive sample of over 16,000 bonds. While our liquidity proxies are 
related to some bond characteristics (e.g. size, age, and maturity etc.) and market 
variables (VIX, TED spread etc.), our tests suggest that they contain new 
information.  
The main objective of our paper is to examine the association between 
corporate bond liquidity and yield spreads. Our pricing regressions show a strong 
link between them, both in time series and in the cross section. Changes in our 
measures explain a large part of the time series variation in aggregate corporate 
bond prices. In the cross-section, holding periods and markups overshadow extant 
liquidity measures and have significant explanatory power for individual bond 
prices. More importantly, we find our liquidity measures can be helpful in 
attempts to explain the credit yield puzzle. Changes in holding periods and 
markup are significant both economically and statistically in explaining variation 
in individual bond’s credit spreads changes. In particular, adding our measures to 
regressions of credit spread changes increases average adjusted R2 from 27% to 
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40%. Finally, consistent with Huang (2003) and Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath 
(2010), we show that the effects of holding periods and markups are particularly 
sharp during crisis periods. 
Overall, our findings help us better understand how corporate bonds are 
priced, in other words, what are the determinants of bond price. These are issues 
of fundamental importance to academics, practitioners, and regulators. For 
academics, exploring the role of liquidity in corporate bond pricing is important 
and a necessary step toward a unified theory of asset pricing. It is a common 
practice for practitioners to draw conclusions regarding default 
probabilities/recovery rate from corporate yield spreads, or vice verse. Our 
findings imply that this approach is inappropriate for high rated bonds, and 
especially in crisis periods. For regulators, our study provides policy making 
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